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This paper deals with the field of military staffs, and places spe-
cial emphasis on the naval staff concepts. It was undertaken in an
effort to help the writer understand more fully the important role of
staff machinery in the Navy, and to develop an appreciation of the sound
and tested staff organizational devices.
The contents of this paper have been gleaned from as wide a variety
of sources as was available. I wish to acknowledge in particular, the
stimulus of the writings of the following military officers! Captain
S. S. Miller, U. S. Havy; Captain F. A. Dingfelder, U. 5. Navy; Lt. Colo-
nel J. D. Hittle, 0* 3. Marine Corps; and Lt. Colonel F. M. Arthur, U. S.
Army. I am greatly indebted to these officers, and feel that this study
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The course of instruction in the itiavy Graduate Comptrollership
Program at The George Washington University, aside from its primary
mission, that of developing officers for the comptrollership function,
has served to stimulate motivation in many directions in the field of
organisation and management. One of these directions has led to the
feeling of inadequacy regarding knowledge in the field of military
staffs, their organisation and function.
Perhaps the major impetus behind this feeling mas inspired by the
area of doubt that surrounds the difficulties involved in attaining
coordination between the line and the staff personnel in industry.
although much has been written by business theorists regarding
organisational principles and concepts, as well as techniques, systems,
methods and procedures, top management is still searching for the answer
which would permit more effective and efficient management of large
industrial complexes. The theorists are in general agreement that the
line and staff concept, so common in big business, was adopted from the
military services, however such modern critics as Lewpawsky, Dale, and
Qrwick allege that industry has never fully understood the military
organisation they had adopted for use.
This suggests that big business, the organisational giants, have
thus far been experiencing difficulty in evolving a simple, single sys-
tem that would be easily adaptable to all types of enterprises, and one
which would fulfill the managerial problems of directing and controlling
large industrial complexes. This is indeed a challenge for all military
personnel involved in the field of management. The mechanics and tech-
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niques of the present staff system of the military forces have proved a
practical and efficient instrumentality* The writing of this paper was
undertaken in an effort to learn more of these available techniques, and
to this end has been richly rewarding.
In seeking material for this study, one is struck with the abundance
of literature dealing with the command and staff structure of the Army*
Conversely, the absence of material from the pens of Naval writers is
apparent* There are those who have produced able discussions on the
principles of war, certain tactical theories, and many of the abstract
-features that make up the profession of arms afloat. Rarely, however,
does one find in writing a direct reference to the techniques or the
evolution of naval staffs.
In attempting to present the command and staff structure of the
military service, special emphasis is placed on the naval concepts and
principles. In addition, the discussion is oriented to a naval opera-
tional staff at about the task force commander level. Space does not
allow discussion of administrative staffs, which of course vary some-
what from operational staffs due to the basic functions they perform.
The former concerns itself with personnel administration, basic train-
ing, and initial conditioning of ships and aircraft. The latter, are
more concerned with the overall training for oombat and in planning for,
and the supervising the execution of combat operations » The basic ideas
of staff functioning and organisation are, however applicable to any
staff.
The material is necessarily limited in scope and in detail, and is
discussed in five parts. First, pertinent historical data are briefly
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presented (Chapter II) as background material. Then some underlying
philosophies surrounding naval staff concepts (Chapter III). Next is
a discussion of the fundamentals (Chapter IV) followed by the functions
and organisation of naval staffs (Chapter V). Some typical naral staffs
are illustrated and analysed in (Chapter VI), and finally the conclusions
drawn from the study (Chapter VII).





ETOLUTIQK OF THE MILITARY STAFF
The modem military systems of land and sea forces are the products
of no particular age. Rather they are the products of many centuries of
Military evolution* Military staffs due to their dynamic characteristics
are in a constant state of flux, continually endeavoring to keep pace
with the changes in the scientific, social, and political fields.
Staff instrumentalities cannot be considered independently from the
nature of warfare itself. Until the nineteenth century, military organi-
sations were small compared to modern standards. The concept of com-
pactness was effectively used until the introduction of gunpowder. In
that the armies and nariea were instruments of the sovereign, they were
commanded by professional and mercenary officers who controlled the
entire force in battle. Hooney and Reiley wrote: "Campaigns may cover
large areas, but on the actual battlefield, the armies were well concen-
trated.»* From the French Revolution onward warfare became a national
endeavor of concern to the entire population. It wasn*t until iorld
war X that the concept of total war emerged. Rear areas and non-combat-
ants, formerly Immune to the horrors of war, found themselves involved
In the fight for existence. Xt remained however, for World War XX to
drive home the significance of total and global warfare. World War XX,
the greatest struggle ever, brought an estimated total of 93,000,000
into direct conflict.2 Xt involved practically total mobilization of the
participating nations. To the United States it meant 1U, 000, 000 oltisens
X. James D. Mooney and Alan C. Reiley, Onward Industry (NX
Harper Brothers 1931), p.2?8
2. General George C. liarsall, The Winning of toe war in Europe
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into the military services. Within such a frame of reference has the
military staffs evolved.
Historical Evolution . It is not considered within the scope of this
paper to explore in detail the evolution of military staffs from antiq-
uity. However, it is considered that for background material, something
of a summary review would be of value.
The roots of the modern military staff were clearly discernable as
early as 1500 B.C., when the Egyptian armies contained a separate logis-
tical agency with distinct titles for the supply officers .3 Functional
specialists were clearly in evidence by £00 B.C. within the Persian
armies of Darius. They were} Intelligence, Supply, Administration, and
Engineers. The function of operations officer did not emerge until the
late sixteenth century. To the seventeenth century, Hittle summarises
as j
Essentially the story of how, through custom and necessity,
certain specific duties gradually were assigned to the various
officers who were part of the headquarters personnel of the
commander.^
The general foundations of modem staffs however, stemmed from the
innovations of Qustavus Aldolphus between 1621 and 1632. His concept of
such special staff assistants within the headquarters was the genesis.
according to Hittle:
From the standpoint of the evolution of the modern staff systems,
the historical evidence strongly supports the contention that all
European staffs stem from the system of Qustavus All changes
after Qustavus might well be considered as variations on the basic
theme
.*
3 . Department of The Army, The Senior BQTC Manual, Volume XII
(First Edition] Washington i The Adjudant General 1$*6) p. 265.
U. J. D. Hittle, LT. COL. DSMC, The Military Staff
(Harrisburgt The Military Publishing Company 19hh) p. 9.
5. Ibid,, pp. 38-39.
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Frederick the Great, laid the cornerstone of training and education
in creating and maintaining an adequate command and staff system. He
had little use for large staffs, but realised the need for proper organi-
sation and for the necessity of an intellectual foundation to support the
staff structure. Through him, Prussia became the first nation to estab-
lish a permanent organisation to educate and qualify staff officers.^
From the Napoleonic era came the notion of the coordination of the
staff and true delegation of authority. Under Napoleon, the chief of
staff concept emerged; as the coordinator of all staff activities and
the expediter of the decisions of the commander. Delegation of authority
and supervisory power became recognised in staff operations. Staff tools
and procedures were perfected.'
The Prussian General Staff under the guidance of lloltke, perfected
the Napoleolic concepts and created centralized command. Under this
system were perfection of staff efficiency and the divorcement of the
commander from active participation in battle leadership — rather he
became the director of large scale complex combat operations.
The great German General Staff was simply an extension and refine-
ment of the Prussian concepts. Efficiency was the keynote of such staff
operations. ° The French and British General Staffs were, in large,
adapted from the Prussian system.
In the United States an adequate staff system was slow to emerge,
its history starting on June 16, 1775? at which time Congress took action
to provide Washington with a staff. The system was essentially British,
6. Ibid., pp. 51-52.
7. Ibid., p. 82.


















and greatly inferior to the continental systems being developed. Wash-
ington was later assisted by Von Steuben, a product from the schools and
the campaigns of Frederick the Great.
At the outset of the Civil liar, the staff system was essentially the
same inadequate Revolutionary staff system, and although some satisfac-
tory changes were made, it remained relatively stagnant until after the
Spanish-American War. Commencing in lB9kt Secretary of War Slihu Boot
launched a campaign that was to culminate in 1903, when Congress author-
ised a General Staff System for the United States Army, this first organi-
sation provided little more than the establishment of various committees
to study the problems involved.?
Theodore Roosevelt was less successful in his attempt to reorganise
the Navy Department. Since the year 181*2, the department had been divided
into administrative divisions or bureaus. Each division chief was respon-
sible only to the Secretary of the Navy, a civilian, who rarely possessed
sufficient technical knowledge to perform the functions of supervision
and coordination well, if at all. As a result, there was waste and con-
stant conflicts of jurisdiction.10
To remedy the situation, the officers of the Line had long advocated
a permanent Board of Line Officers, which in effect would constitute a
Naval General Staff. They envisioned the Board to have broad powers over
the bureaus, and as a consultant to the Secretary of the Navy, on all
matters pertaining to policy and administration, tfhile this plan had
much to commend it, especially on pure military grounds, Congress opposed
it, fearing that such a body would reduce the Secretary to a mere figure-
9. Ibid., pp. 132-135
.
10. Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise Of American Naval
Power, (N.J. Princeton University Press 1951FJ p.27^7"
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headA in addition to usurping Congressional use of the Navy to better
serve political alas.
Teddy Roosevelt however, with preparation Tor war utmost in his
Bind, championed the general staff idea. He forced the issue before
Congress in 190U, but failed to receive any action. In 1?08 impetus
was again given to the concept, due in a large sense, to several grave
charges instituted against the Department for the approval and the build-
ing of battleships nith gross defects, apparent only after they had joined
the Fleet • This permitted a second drive for a naval general staff,
headed by admiral Sims and backed by President Roosevelt. The attempt
-eas again unsuccessful, and could have not been otherwise due to the
President's unhappy relations with the Congress. 11
At the outset of World War I the military services were inadequately
organised and staffed. General Pershing recognised this and created
staffs throughout the AEF organisation. This system stemmed from the
British and French, and were war proved general staff concepts, although
the French system predominated. By the close of the war, and assisted by
the passage of the Overman Act in May, 1918, the War Department resembled
a sound and respectable organisation, organised functionally into four
main divisions; Operations, lar Plans, Intelligence, and Logistics. There
was, in addition, added the Office of the Chief of Staff to serve as the
overall coordinator of the four divisions.i2
The period between the close of World war I and 1939 saw the lessons
learned Incorporated into the National Defense Act. From 1939 onward
many changes in organisation resulted primarily necessitated by the nature
of the global warfare aspeots of the terrifying war to some.
11. Ibid., p. 276.
12. Hittle, Op. cit., pp. 261-262.
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CHAPTER III
NAVAL STAFF CONCEPTS
Chapter II discussed briefly the development of the military staff
concept. Of necessity, the emphasis was placed on the United States
Army staff system* It can be reasonably concluded, that this system with
its historical heritage, has been battle tested in two major wars, as
demonstrated in the crucible of global and total war, and that it is a
practical and efficient instrumentality. In the system, the terms as
used; that of staff, staff systems, and the general staff system are
described as follows:1
Staff . In the military sense, the staff of a unit consists of the
officers who assist the commander in the exercise of command. Prefixing
the word "general" to staff means that it assists him in commanding his
organization.
Special Staff . A group of technical officers operating as the com-
mander's executive staff and representing the functions which the com-
mander's brain is supposed to encompass. It integrates the planning,
programs, and the actions so that the functions are coordinated to pro-
duce reasonable and timely plans for the commander to order his units to
execute. In addition they are advisors to the general staff on technical
matters.
Agents of Command . The staff are agents of command, who in addition
to formulating plans, gathering information, and transmitting orders,
function as supervisory agents of the commander. They have vested in
themselves such delegated authority of the commander as he sees fit to
give them.
I. Joint Chiefs Of Staff, Dictionary of United States Military
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Chief of Staff. Functions to coordinate the efforts of the members
of the staff so that details are smoothly dovetailed.
Staff System. A system for the selection of staff officers.
Qeneral Staff System. Such a system is employed by most of the
major armies of the world. There are four requirements before it can be
said that a service has a general staff system.2 They arei
(*) Staff Corps. First there must be a Qeneral Staff Corps.
Normally it is a closed service. The officers from the time of
their entrance spend the majority of their careers In this duty.
C&) Staff Schooling . Secondly there must be a continuous and
progressive system of staff education in functions of staff work
in own and higher units.
(C) Staff Doctrine. Third there must be in existence a set of
staff doctrines in writing, and approved by higher authority, which
prescribes the functions to be performed by the member of the staff,
and the manner of execution.
(B) Similarity of Staffs , fourth, the staff organisation is
essentially the same in all units, from the highest to the lowest
units subjected to staff organisation.
In direct contrast to the general staff concept of the Army, no Mary
has ever employed a general staff system. This fact has considerable
significance when it is compared with the fact that almost all armies have
developed such a system. It is based upon the differing needs of armies
and navies. Ponderous national armies med a general staff system, at
2. S. R. Shaw, Col., OSMJ, A Qeneral Staff System for toe Navy,
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least for the operational forces to engage in combat, naval forces do
not .3
In theory, the command of a naval force is exercised by one man.
In practice, the actual orders Issued to govern the administration of a
Fleet may frequently not eminate from the mind of the commander at all,
but may simply reflect his policies, or evolve from instructions approved
by him.
a staff organisation afloat aims at accommodating itself to its own
existing departmental shore stations and fleet administrations, while
preserving within Itself the fundamental requirements of its command, the
ideas, policies, and the intentions! of the commander it serves, of supply-
ing him with the information that is essential to the discharge of its
high functions.** In this manner, the commander is afforded the means by
which he can impose his will promptly, understandingly, and unquestionly
upon his subordinates.
Naval theorists suggest that it would be an error, under existing
popular conditions, to form an ideal organisation for a supreme general
staff for the Navy, except as an academic diversion. Rather the formu-
lation of detached staffs afloat conform to the restriction imposed by
the unique aspects of sea warfare.
5
It is generally felt that the ultimate objective of a naval com-
mander is the defeat of the enemy in battle, fo accomplish this, he must
have a weapon, ability to use the weapon, and plans for the weapons use.
3. Ibid,, p. 283.
a. G. S. Freeman, Capt. Xfm, The Sxeroise of Qojsaand Afloat.
Volume 331, (U S Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1930) pp. 779-791.
$. Ibid,, p. 76£.
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In Naval warfare his weapon is the fleet and the personnel who man the
ships. His ability to use the weapon depends not alone on himself, bat
upon those who are to him as are the brain impulses motivating the
warrior — his staff. Bis plan for using the weapon must be based on a
knowledge of his opponent and his opponent's weapons. In high commands
the knowledge required of commanders is actually beyond any one nanis
capabilities and capacities. Here we find the root of the need for
effective staff operations.
Evolving as they did from their modest beginnings in the Havy,
(simply a Flag Lieutenant and Flag Secretary), in which the commander
was able to personally perform all the functions of command, staffs have
grown gradually to such proportions that they continually warrant thorough
examination and analysis. There has been from time to time agitation in
attempts to foster the army general staff system to naval staffs as pre-
viously indicated, It is generally felt that such is doomed to failure
as long as the navy is without a supreme general staff, nor is it probable
that even with such a supreme staff, the organisation of naval staffs
afloat would follow along army lines . In land warfare, in its purely
objective and material aspects, there is no real counterpart to the fleet.
The sharp differentiations made in the army between staff duties and what
are classed as technical and administrative staff duties, are not at all
in harmony with present naval organisations, nor with commonly accepted
naval concepts of organisation. Insofar as possible the fleet must be
fit for fighting at all times* The commander must have at hand at all
times the agency for keeping him in intimate touch with all the phases of
his exercise of command. In other words maintenance in any concept of
naval organisation is primary and elemental* As expressed earlier, it is
;.: ,---J :;•,•.';;•;» .?.-->8./.-%y , : :._.,''Ci v':/ til c. Slid ftt ;• * tttfl M&Orf£ H|
as*-.' . •3l€-<PLfiCi» i>«* :"*
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the function of making and keeping the weapon ready for use— the
foundation function. With the essential aid of information , appropiate
plans can be drawn to conduct operations which through communications
culminates in action, the reaction of which is reflected in the secre-
tariat.
Actually, sound organisation is essential to effective staff func-
tioning. The Navy unlike the other services, does not have a definite
or dogmatic organisational plan which it adopts. It is felt that this
is a good thing as it permits the commander to exercise his own i&eas of
organisational techniques, and to mold his staff closely to the peculiar
requirements of his command. In view of this organisational freedom, it
could be expected that wide variations in naval staff structures occur, but
such is not the case, and one finds various echelons of command conform-
ing to fairly standard patterns. This is due to three things s First,
most naval commanders, from practical experience, have in common, the
appreciation of the practical application of the basic principles of
organisation. Secondly, the actual functions of command are comparable
in similar organisations. And thirdly, patterns of staffs tend to be
influenced by initial allowances predetermined by the Mavy Department."
A commander normally has a choice as to individuals, but the numbers
ordered to him are based on known requirements and availability of per-
sonnel.
Thus with other factors being equal, one can see why similar staff
commands adopt 3tractores that lend towards standardisation.
Of passing interest, although not particularly pertinent, the Navy
6. F. A. Dingfelder, Capt. U.SJS. "Naval Staff Organization
and Functioning" Haval war College Information Service for Officers
(January 1952) p. 2$.
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Department can be described as operating under what can be described as
a parallel type of organizational structure as opposed to the Army Gen-
eral Staff system. This is shown in Figure 1. Here is found the Chief
of Naval operations under the Secretary of the Navy heading up the oper-
ating forces (field forces) of the naval establishment, one of the paral-
lel branches. Another parallel branch is the business and adrainistration
establishment of the Navy, headed up directly by the Secretary's civilian
assistants. In this branch are the bureaus and the offices of the Navy
Department. Between these two branches there is provided a considerable
amount of cross connection among the various bureaus and offices, and
the policy level of the Chief of Naval Operations. It should be noted
that this parallel type of organization has been in existence for over a
century and a half. To use this as a criteria alone would be foolhardy,
but it does indicate the durableness of its features. There have been
various changes and additions over the years to provide for the technical
progressions in naval warfare, and for the changes in the size and scope
of operations. It is most interesting to note that the basic structure,
the framework has remained the same.
An examination of any organization must take into account the objec-
tive or end product. In the ftavy, this objective is to provide an effec-
tive combatant fighting force. The experiences of 7/orld ¥ar II and the
Korean Incident, the equipment and the tactics of the fast carrier task
forces, (superior to any competitors, allied or enemy), indicate that the
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FUNDAMENTALS OF NAVAL STAFF ORQAK&AttDH
"To prepare the operation is to plan and organise] to see that
they are carried out is to command and coordinate} to watch the
results is to control*. 1
Although discussed previously, it is necessary to mention the "why*1
of a staff. Hhy is a staff necessary? Briefly, the many details inher-
ent to any large organisation makes it practically impossible for the top
executive or commander himself to become involved with all these details
and still perform his primary function of command.
In discussing the need for a functional and coordinated staff serv-
ice, Mooney and Reiley point out some very broad relationships between
the commander and his staff as follows:
Always there are too many things to think about, too many factors
to consider, too many problems to solve, too diversified a knowledge
required for the solution for the unaided capacity for one leader to
compass. Though all decisions must remain with the directing head,
it is imperative that these problems should come to him pre-digested,
with all the thought and the research that organised staff service
can bestow upon them. The staff is an extension of the personality
of the executive.
^
from the above it can be concluded that the staff can provide the
means by which the commander multiplies and maintains his mental capaci-
ties, energies, skills and his capabilities. Thus, he is able to exer-
cise command of his forces, accurately re-appraise the current situation,
and by constant foresight and initiative, formulate sound decisions;
issue timely plans and directives j and maintain adequate force and drive
to execute his will.
what, in general, are the functions of the commander? An accepted
1. M. Henri Fayol, cited in Army Service Forces Manual M709-I.
Control Manual, (Washington 1 Headquarters, Army Service Forces, March 20,
SBX p7TT~
2. Mooney and Reiley, eg. olt., p. 299.
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definition of theso functions is:
ttTo authoritatively and effectively control and direct the forces
assigned him in the successful accomplishment of his assigned mis-
sions* .3
An analysis of the functions of the commander shove that they include
the functions of his staff, and can be illustrated in algebraic fashion
as:
A = B*C
Where A= Functions of the commander
B = Functions of the staff
C = Incremental functions that the commander alone can
perform,k
It should be clear from the above, that the functions of the com-
mander (A), equals the functions of the staff (B), plus the incremental
functions (C), which the commander himself, alone must perform.
If the commander is sot provided with a staff, then he must perform
all of the functions end we have A minus C. But when he dees have a
staff, which is a must in the higher commands, his functions are equal to
the functions of his staff plus the incremental functions that he alone
must perform. These later incremental functions include the making of
the decisions and the bearing of the full responsibility for everything
his forces do, or fail to do.
To complete this equation, we find that B, the functions of the staff
can be derived from its mission t
The mission of the staff is to assist the commander in the dis-
charge of his commend function.
3. 3. S. Miller, Captain, USN., "Naval Staffs", Naval War
College Information Service For Officers
,,
(January 19£2) p. k»
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The staff should perform the following tasks for the oommandert
1. Gather and evaluate detailed and accurate information in
order to advise the commander on all phases of the existing situa-
tion; strategical, tactical, and logistical.
2. Develop policies and prepare plans, schedules, and directives
for the commander, based upon the mission and directives from higher
authorities.
3. Disseminate information and directives to subordinate com-
manders, and information and reports to higher authorities; rapidly,
accurately, and completely, in the execution of the commander's
duties.
£
In order that the staff can best assist the commander in the exer-
cise of his command, they must have a thorough understanding of the
policies of the commander, and be acquainted with the subordinate com-
manders and their units. tfader the basic purposes shown, the duties of
a staff may be grouped under the following main functions:
*• Erovjdc information required by the commander to plan and
conduct operations.
2. Make continuous studies of the situation for anticipatory
planning .
3. Submit recommendations as to policies, plana, and orders to
the commander in compliance with the directives or own initiative.
orders, and causing them to be disseminated to the command.
5>. Exercising such supervision as may be directed to insure the
carrying out of the intentions and policies of the commander.
6
The first function is to "provide information". This all important
function provides the basis for Sound Military Decision. 7 this necessary
5. U.S. Naval lar College, Principles of Naval Staff Organisa-
tion (Newport, E. I. Undated) p. 1.
6. Command and General Staff College, M XOI-5, General Staff
Officers Manual. Draft, (Ft. Leavenworth t The College, X9kl) pp., 10-11.
7. U.S. Haval lar College, Sound Military Decision. (Newport,
R. I. 19U2) p., 10.
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information on own and enemy forces, and other tangible and intangible
matters must be constantly obtained from ever:'- fruitful sources evaluated
and analyzed to insure that it is sufficiently detailed and accurate to
permit the commander to make sound strategic, tactical, and logistic
plans. This information must be disseminated to all friendly commands
who need to know, as -well as -within the staff itself to insure coordi-
nated staff action.
The second function is that of "anticipatory planning". It entails
making a continuous study of the situation and preparing plans for possi-
ble future contingencies in the fields of strategy, tactics, and logistics.
The third function is making recommendations for the "plans and
orders", based upon the mission of the commander, and also on directives
received from higher authority.
The fourth function is "translating" the commanders decisions into
"directives11 . This function includes the transmission of such directives
accurately, surely, and in timely fashion to the properly designated re-
cipients •
The fifth function is "supervising and evaluating". To the extent
authorised by the commander, certain designated members of the staff super-
vise the execution of the plans and orders, and take such action as is
necessary, always in the name of the commander, to insure the commander's
intentions are carried out. The evaluating function concerns itself with
the results of the planned action, in order to apply lessons learned to
future operations, and planning.
There are specific fundamentals of good staff organization. A de-
tailed listing of these principles is listed in Appendix A of this paper,
prepared by the Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl
Harbor attack. They are actually the "inner -workings" to allow the staff
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to function properly. These fundamentals are not dogmas or all inclusive.
They are merely guides which the commander and his staff thoughtfully
consider and use, as appropriate, in organizing and operating their staffs,
and their sub-staffs.
These fundamentals, when broken down, actually fall into two types,
Static and Dynamic .
The following are the Static fundamentals of staff organization;
1. Unity of Command
2. Span of Control
3. Homogeneous Assignment
k» Delegation of Authority "
These fundamentals are termed "static 1 '* because they are fixed,
"standing still", and are the framework or matrix in which the staff
functions dynamically, as living organism. They are the skeleton which
does not become dynamic until fired into action by the dynamic fundamen-
tals described later.
The first of these fundamentals is "unity of command". Hapoleon in
one of his Maxims stated: "Mothing is more important in war than unity
of command". 9 Nearly three quarters of a century later, Von Moltke,
famous chief of the Imperial German General Staff said:
"Doctrine is to the soldier what policy is to the statesman.
As the basis of doctrine, every leader must be supreme within his
command else he cannot accomplish his mission." *"
This fundamental provides that the ultimate control of all action in
8. Miller, og. cit., p. 6.
9. Colonel C. H. Lanza, Napoleon and Modern War (His Military
Maxims Revised and Annotated) (Harrisburg: The Military Service Publish-
ing Company, X9U3 ), p. 8£.
10. Colonel H. LeR. Muller, Techniques of Modern Arms , (Harris-
burg: The Military Service Publishing Company, I9U0), p. 53.
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any organization must be vested in one individual at any organizational
level. One " commander" is located at each controlling level. This is
a must for all good staff organizations. Each individual must know his
job, and must know "to whom he reports", and who reports to him. In this
way unity of staff action can best be assured.
The second fundamental is "span of control" . This fundamental de-
fines the optimum number of individuals to be controlled from a central
source and the considerations associated therewith. The commander should
not control too many individuals nor too few directly. The commander
must also consider the space and the time magnitudes which separate him
from those subordinate individuals over whom he exercises direct control.
Current theory has it that the number of subordinate individuals directly
controlled by the commander should not be less than three nor more than
seven. This bracket permits the commander to operate at peak efficienc, .
Many writers of business literature have attempted to fix upper^nost
limits upon the number of subordinates which a principle can supervise
effectively. The number has generally run from three to six. Other
writers have suggested that no rigid upper limit exists, but that any
limit over seventeen or eighteen should be in suspect. Gulick and Urwiok,
however, state:
"In actual practice it is necessary to investigate the relation-
ships of concern to the executive, rather than to depend upon the
mere numbers of employees in his division". **
Perrin Stryker, in discussing span of control, reports that Fish
and Dale, and others of note, in their investigations of span of control
II. L. Gulick, and L. Jrwick (eds) Papers on the Science of
Administratlon
,
(Institute of Public Administration, 193777 PP»> 1^1-188.;
cited in Newman^ Administrative Action, p. 261.
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in industry have found key executives supervising from eight to twenty-
five , I2
The third fundamental is "homogeneous assignment", derived from the
Greek "homos"—meaning "same", and "genos" -—meaning "race" or "kind". It
means as we use it, same assignment. As applied to organizations, tills
fundamental requires that units or individuals within an organization
should be assigned to tasks which are of the same kind or related nature,
taking advantage of each individuals training and natural aptitude. Thus,
an individual trained in aerology would be assigned to the Operations
Department rather than, say the Logistics Department.
The fourth static fundamental is "delegation of authority". Although
the responsibility of the commander cannot be delegated, the authority of
the commander can be delegated by himself if he so desires.
In this regard, the doctrine promulgated at the Command and General
Staff College is as follows:
Tftiile the heads of staff sections are often given wide lattitude
to issue orders and instructions in the implementation of orders
and policies of the commander, this authority is always delegated
and is exercised in the name of the con;zander. This delegation must
be the subject of constant review and inspection. 13
In a staff, no staff officer, acting in that capacity alone has any
authority to command whatsoever. The commander, on the other hand, can
and does authorize certain members of his staff to act for him on pre-
determined matters and within strict policy limits which he has establish-
ed. All staff officers thus designated act in the name of the commander,
12. Perrin Stryker, "Can Management Be Managed?", Fortune
(July 1953), IOO-IOI, 138-1)1,.
13. Command and Staff College, Advance Sheet 1010, Principles
of Staff Organization—II (Fort Leavenworth: The College, 19u7), p". I.
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and the responsibility for their actions remain with the coamander.













There is no necessity of going into detail of all of the nine funda-
mentals listed, as they are covered in any book on leadership. Suffice
to say that selflessness of staff officers is an essential part of the
dynamic fundamentals of good staff functioning. Every staff officer must
submerge his own desires \ he must work for the good of the commander, and
once a decision is reached, support the commanders decision as if it were
his own. The staff officer is completely honest and frank with his com-
mander and associates and he thus avoids misunderstanding which undermines
dynamic functioning. A staff officer must, in order to contribute most to
the success of his commander, have well founded knowledge and his judge-
ment must be sound, endeavoring at all times to increase his knowledge and
improve his judgement. In his human relations he is tactful, forebearing,
and friendlyi he is willing to accept responsibility when given to him and
III. Miller, oj>. cit., p. 9.
3«*X ».~'v ho*
.
mil 9aisi mif lo Iln 'i
20 o xcq JjBiin&ea© ha el sit
5 . si-": • jniiji-v: ^ ^.bm.. 1j BJb±ov£ .. : .' •>.. town EM&ftisoae* nJ rofefuM




•x*eoe*»:>l tXu'J. *ai oml . ,$ammi
»
-2ii-
strives to work in harmony with others, He should endeavor to gain full
respect from his fellow staff associates by insuring that his motives in
all matters are beyond question. The "Golden Rule" of a good functioning
staff include; cooperation, coordination, and collaboration. The Chief
of Staff is responsible to see that the actions implied by the "three
golden C's" are carried out. In addition, the Chief of Staff makes vrexj
effort to insure that timing in integrated staff work is carried out and
fully accomplished.
The delicate relationship between the Static (S) and the Dynamic (D)
fundamentals of staff functions (F) can be compared to a set of delicate
scales. 3hen (S) and (D) fundamentals are in balance on the pivot (F)j
the best coordination is achieved, the organization is sound, it func-
tions smoothly, and the commander is free to most effectively do his job.
He is relieved of the details, and can devote his attentions to perform-
ing his primary tasks.
If however, an over emphasis is placed on either the (S) or the (D)
fundamentals, the balance is disturbed, and the organisation ceases to
function properly, and it will be necessary to counteract the situation
with an over emphasis on the opposite set of fundamentals.
None of the above three considerations can be neglected in organiz-
ing and operating naval staffs. The staff must perform their designated
functions, they must be organized along sound static fundamental lines,
and that their functioning is assured by the timely and proper application
of the dynamic fundamentals. Over emphasizing either the static or the
dynamic fundamentals must be avoided.
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•©•ny-" or-. >±Xq«I anoi^ojs etit todtf ese otf «Icii:ajttoqs»f ci ll-edv
>re sexaci IIjb^S lo IsjL
ii'csso el aitCTsr Haia b&d*rt%9$aJ: aX §n±rsi<r Jsjfc? a "tie
»l»tib±£qmaa t&£Iu1
^jsct^Q &iiS baa (2) oitatfc ertt noaw*&tf qiile.*
3b 1c ctee a oJ boioc^'<09 otf obo Ci) c il lt*>: 'Sa&neami-
(1) Jovxq oiU ao ooruilod ni o*m eJLBtaaaabfc. .seleoa
.itfttioe el aoli&sloes^o snj tt>ovoJLfio* ei softtae
>t ciii o* sm* si wfannse erf? ftea ,r!jtfoQHe ttr-
>q od" enoiuh oH
,s£«£o vrasti^iq eld g
•f?rl:5-i©. ;tt !»•
oj- eoeaoo . : ejtf bivs. . 2> *t MM*.
fGjtfatrtJta jv(J forroJnpoo orf -Nrroaaeoaa *<? UJm *£ ixie ^Jtaxicirr nol^aturl
to *•« o^teo r&isr
:»fcl«kftoo enrftf »vti''.i; odd lo (mold,





FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION OF A NAVAL STAFF
As stated previously, the functions of the commander -was n to author-
itatively and effectively control and direct the forces assigned him in
the successful accomplishment of his assigned tasks".
This general function may be specifically suo-divided into two broad
categories
:
X. Operational (leading to the direct accomplishment of the
assigned mission)
2. Supporting (permitting success of X above) *
The broad categories are further sub-divided into many functions
which will be listed in the various illustrations which follow. liowever,
an analysis of the many functions shows that they all can be included






k. Operations and Plans
5. Logistics
6. Communications^
Since all functions of command can be segregated into these six
major categories, acceptance of this segregation of functions as a basis
for divisional organisation of a naval staff can be accomplished.
If this is done, a basic organisational plan of a representative
staff can be arrived at, and is shown as Figure 2. Here we see the com-
mander and his two aides, the Chief of Staff, and under the Chief of Staff,
1. F. A. Dingfelder, op. cit., p. 25.
2. Ibid., p. 29.
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the five divisions mentioned earlier — Administration, Intelligence,
Operations and Plans, Logistics, and Communications. The primary and
important function, that of Decision -will of course be performed by the
commander himself.
This plan is recognised as the basic structure upon which practically
all naval staffs are organised.
It should be noted that the staff divisions are numbered; 9-1, H-2,
• . .N-5. The first four divisions correspond to the Army ttGn , and the
Air Force "A" divisions. Current policy recommends use of the division
numbering system by naval staffs due to the ease of laison between the
services, and intra-staff functioning. Communications is designated as
M-S, and if any additional divisions are required, they could assume the
number N-6, and so forth. If the staff were organised along joint lines,
the divisions would be numbered} J-I, J
-2, etc., and for a com-
bined staff; C-I etc. The title Assistant Chief of Staff is a desirable
title adopted in the larger staffs, whereas in the smaller staffs, the
title of Administrative Officer, Operations Officer, etc., is more appro-
priate. With such a basic plan it is an easy matter to assign homogene-
ously, the various functions which a staff must perform, to appropriate
staff divisions, le then have the detailed functional charts, indicative
of those shown as figures I through 9.
Figure 3 shows the position of the commander and his two aides.
Under the commander there is assigned the functions of Decision , such
matters as concern basic policy, commendations, discipline, and moral.
The Flag Secretary, in the position shown acts only in the capacity of
an aide, but normally has other duties as head of the Administrative
Division. In addition to the principle duty as personal aide to the com-
mander, The Flag Lieutenant is normally assigned the duties of Flag Sig-
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nal Officer, and the Division Officer for the enlisted personnel of the
Flag allowanoe. He is also normally responsible for the timely and prop-
er rendition of honors and salutes as well as the conduct of official
ceremonies, in addition to supervising the operation of the flag boats
and automobiles.
Figure h shows the position of the Chief of Staff. In addition to
his duties as senior aide and advisor to the commander, he is responsible
for coordinating the work of the staff, and for insuring that the policies
and the plans of the commander are carried out in accordance with his
intentions and will. The Chief of Staff must be a dynamic, intelligent,
and industrious officer for this important focal point of any smooth func-
tioning staff.
Figure 5 shows the H-I, Administrative Division, which is normally
assigned to the Flag Secretary, and includes official correspondence*
files, custody of classified matter, except messages, etc. Also such
matters as personnel, legal, dental, public information, etc.
The N-2, Intelligence Division is shown as Figure 6. It collects,
evaluates, and disseminates intelligence information. The Operational
Intelligence section may include special intelligence; such as tactical
information on enemy movements. The Strategic Intelligence section nor-
mally includes estimates and studies necessary for future planning of
strategic nature. This division is also responsible for technical and
counter-intelligence, for censorship, and for the maintenance of the
current situation or strategic plot*
Figure 7 shows the Operations and Plans Division. The Operations
section of this division is responsible for assigning and coordinating
the units assigned to the command, and for directing the operations of
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these units. This normally includes such special operations as may be
associated with a particular type of command. They will also be respon-
sible for Training and Aerology, as well as supervising the activities
in the flag plot mentioned before. The Plana section includes both cur-
rent and future planning, and the responsibility for maintaining Laison
with other commands.
Figure 8 shows the K-l*, Logistics Division, and is assigned such
functions as supply, fiscal matters, repairs and maintenance of the fleet
units attached to the command, statistics, etc. Here is conducted the
important function of financial management. Although not within the
scope cf this paper, it is personally felt that this represents a fertile
area for the adoption of sound comptrollership concepts.
The N-5 Communications Division, shown in Figure 9, provides such
rapid communication facilities as will insure positive command communi-
cation within the command and with other pertinent commands. This divi-
sion is also responsible for the registered and classified publications,
for the operation of the message center, for communication security and
intelligence etc.
This completes the discussion of the detailed functional charts.
They are by no means perfect nor fully inclusive. There are many addi-
tional functions, and the assignments may vary. However, the charts give
a fairly good over-all picture of the functions performed by the staff,
and in addition, groups the similar functions within the various divi-
sions to indicate the skills required by those performing them.
In this connection, extensive thought should be given to the deter-
mination of the ranks, skills, and the qualifications of the staff mem-
bers who are required to perform the duties listed, and to the establish-
pB is tnaLtorxeqo lAioeq« /loir* se*u;l9a£ ^£X«n:oa eidT .ft&tixtf wmdt
oq»en oor esXfi JXfcw 4©dT .fcoawoo lo *£# '; 'i«q * jfW-ir' frrf«2ooe««
s»£J£v£40£ exitf aalali*i»qps s* XXmr ba ivs«IcaeA Jbo» giiiotsiT no') *X
Jocf wh/;Iofli :;oJtfo»». eiiaTS adT .«ioW JbeaoitaNB ^oXq saH Mtt at
obIaI anEntatalag vol vjtlxafenoqsei dxt# ia* t . y^tm**!'. . ^'jcl'^I ho* &m
.aJhomnoo ief&o &Jbr
: na&ltM* «i forus tnol8lY2(X *toLSz±%Cki .iU*i eii? waroifa 6 •nuaiY
*»*flan»inl— Jwu» eatw^'v ers»**«8i JUo»i:x t-^Eqqxr» s* aaoitfanijl.
o J -..:,. r. . .v. :•.:- .,,.;- ^:,ci*»i.'*»Ai cftftflMf* Mil ft* W ,::.:* v-c.^v:
dsjoffv.v.. .
*»! £ StoOTcq* teiit Jlol ^UUiioe'seq *1 Ji t -v*qiiq fclftf t« ©h©o«
.ciqeacoo qlxfeifciicTtJocico r<m;oe io acltfqQha »£J i«$ aon*
co i,;: .. ..-' v. o ' oq *M*J iXbl M •ItJXto.fc-. • ;..).;•; fcJMMtl Mpi
rib eiriT .tJbaflMEOd woMdUhisq •wwl^o AUt. roaeaaoo tc
li b9*&3*iytrt ©fW 10'i jqe©* o*JU a.t noie
.ux> iol ,•»$«•• ft&ac—
«
•atfiado ixnc.ttooj/i s«Xl*4*b sett 'lo nol—raiih eri* Katfalqcroa aiii?
JUafcut .'/iMi o**fc -T :V afcloiil -;JULi'i T" T»q tOME etc ^ •*** t*^
S aoi.arlo Mtt tYPWwoH .-^xirr p» aJnapngi*; i*xe t r- taooii
llatfa art* -$* baoncolTaq auol^oral •& 1c #it £*-!»• fcooa ;JLiJb*l a
Jiw sjk.
.»& aoJUnolipq aaorfj •#' toTlupn aJXbfe ©*tf atf*oiJbc2 o^ bikui
£-.:
..






























merit of these needs in the 3taff organization.
Combination position and functional charts should be maintained by
every staff. They not only serve as a guide for assigning staff members
to the division where maximum benefit can be derived from their technical
qualifications and professional backgrounds, but also to serve as a con-
stant reminder of the many functions for which the staff is responsible,
and the division of that responsibility within the staff. They also show
the position of every staff member and to whom he is responsible.
The organizational plan discussed is of course subject to such
changes from time to time commensurate with the commanders desires, and
as time and experience indicate need for different arrangements. Never-
theless, the plan described lias endured the rigors of time-hardened tests.
It embodies all of the principles of good organization which are prereq-
uisites of effective management, and which are so apparent in well managed
industries, and sound naval staffs. (See appendix A). The nature and
magnitude of the functions in each division will vary with the oat
echelons and types of uoimiiimlu, but some of all six major functions of
command will be found in each structure, thus forming the foundation. A
staff should never be created from the viewpoint of assigning functions
to individuals, but rather from the viewpoint of assigning individuals
to positions in the organization.
Before turning to typical naval staffs, it is felt some mention
should be made to Completed Staff Action. This important concept in
staff work follows closely the Command and General Staff doctrines
I. Make certain that he (the staff officer) understands the
specific mission assigned to him, and the limitations, if any, on
the scope of his work.
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2. Consult with other staff sections, interested commanders
and agencies to insure that he gains a complete picture of the
background and salient factors upon which to formulate conclusions
as to the course of action.
3. Consider all practical courses of action and the favorable
or unfavorable factors of each. of them.
U. Formulate the recommendations. The staff officer must be
objective and evaluate both advantages and disadvantages of his
recommendations
.
J>. Tfork out detailed steps required for implementation, indi-
cating where appropriate, the plan for supervision.
6. Reduce the results of work to succinct and clear statements
which present the essential facts, show that all alternative plans
have been considered, indicate the views of other agencies concerned
have been considered, and give both the advantages and the disadvan-
tages of the recommended action.
Rules of conduct in following the principles of the above pro-
cedure: Timeliness, thoroughness, and soundness.
3
Another version of completed staff action was promulgated and dis-
tributed by the Provost Marshall General and appears as Appendix B of
this paper. The value of this basic notion is attested to by the fact
that since the original publication in 19k2, the Army-&avy-Air Force
Journal has been asked for reprints by scores of leading firms, univer-
sities, business organizations and libraries. The article is well worth
detailed study by anyone interested in the concept and modus operandi of
completed staff work. A somewhat condensed version promulgated, again,
by the Provost i&arshall General in wall plaque size appears as Appendix C.
3. Command and General Staff College, Advance Sheet 1010,












TYPICAL U. S. NAVAL STAFFS
Having explored the relationships of the various fundamentals of
sound organization as prerequisites to effective staff functioning, an
analysis of typical naval staffs can now be attempted, and in addition,
some comparisons to Army and Air Force type staffs.
The Navy, unlike the other services, does not have a definite or
dogmatic organization plan for universal use. The theory is that this
permits a commander to exploit his own ideas of organizational techniques,
and to fit his staff more closely to the peculiar requirements of his
command. In view of this organizational freedom, a wide variation may be
expected in structures of naval staffs, but such is not the case, and it
is found that staffs at various echelons of command conform to fairly
standard patterns. It is felt that this is due to three reasons:
1. Most naval commanders have a common appreciation of the
practical application of the basic principles of organization.
2. The functions of command are comparable in similar organiza-
tions.
3. The organizational pattern of naval staffs will tend to be
influenced by the fact that their initial personnel allowance is
generally predetermined by the Navy Department. *
A commander may have a choice as to the individuals assigned, but
the number is normally based upon known requirements of similar commands,
and on the availibility of personnel. These factors explain the tendency
towards standardization with the "built in" important requirement of
flexibility of the staff structure.
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Each staff is organized in accordance -with the major tasks and mis-
sions of the command in mind. Generally speaking, it can be said that
there emerges a fairly standard rough pattern for both Operational (sea-
going), and for Administrative (oft times shorebased) staffs. The Opera-
tional, partioularily in times of war, find it impractical to perform
many of their normal administrative functions in the personnel and logis-
tic fields due to security restrictions. Moreover, the housekeeping re-
quirements aboard ship restrict the physical size of the staff. In opera-
tions, the shift of emphasis from one area to another, perhaps thousands
of miles apart, make it mandatory that staffs be organized to handle
varied and complex problems on the spot. Operational staffs must there-
fore contain few men with many, many talents. The administrative details
are handled, in large part, by the ships which house the staff. These
ships, of course, carry their own specialists and gear, however, they too
must be supplied with personnel and logistics support. These latter
administrative requirements are met by rear echelon staffs whose mission
is to preform the essential supporting functions. Commander Service
Force Pacific is an example of an administrative staff, #iereas Commander
IX Fleet is an example of a seagoing operational staff. Discussion and
illustrations of these staffs will follow.
But first, let us examine a typical U. 5. Navy ship organization.
Figure 10 shows a typical standard ship organization. In this case, the
ship has the greater emphasis placed on its offensive power (gunnery).
The Gunnery Officer is therefore designated as a department head rather
than deck offioer.
It should be noted that Administration is handled at the Executive
Officers level. Intelligence falls under both the Operations Officer and
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the Navigator, who in turn supply the Captain with the intelligence
information he needs to know. The operational and planning functions are
of course the responsibility of the Operations Officer. From the point
of view of logistics, there is a tie-in j all falling under the Executive
Officer, the participating departments are| Supply, Medical, Dental,
Engineering, Gunnery, and Operations. These department heads are there-
fore all tied in under the general classification of logistics, and are
agents of the Executive Officer who sees that their logistical require-
ments are coordinated with the Supply Officer. Last, but not least, is
Communications, which provide the means by which the Commander exercises
his command) in this case we see that this function falls under the juris-
diction of the Operations Officer.
Figure II shows the structure of Commander Service Pacific staff,
the typical administrative staff that was touched upon lightly in the
previous discussion. This organisation, which at first glance appears
to violate the important static fundamental of "span of control", actual-
ly does not, due to the dotted line for the six left hand brackets. These
dotted lines are used to indicate that these staff officers have separate
and additional duties as agents of the Commander in Chief of the Fleet,
a higher command. Due to these dual duties, an important laison is
affected between Commander Services Forces and the Fleet Commander.
Actually, the volume of traffic is low between the Chief of Staff and
certain of these divisions. Thus, the Commander, through his Chief of
Staff can afford to have more than seven people reporting to him for
direct control, although the numbers continually controlled are considerably
lower than the chart indicates. Of course if the commander possesses all
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trol, as is frequently the case, the static fundamentals can be violated*
Here is again demonstrated that the static fundamentals are not do L ,:.ias
nor all inclusive, and are violated in special and unique circumstances.
Figure 12 shows the stracture of the staff of Commander XX Fleet, a
hypothetical typical operating staff as discussed before. Here is found
the more usual tie-in across the board with no further comment or expla-
nations thought necessary.
An analysis of the sister services will now be attempted. Figure 13
shows a typical Army staff. Here we can see the character of Army staffs
which Navy staffs do not always have. Up at the level of the commander
is found his personal staff, his aides and others. Others frequently
include; Inspector General, Public Relations, etc. The Chief of Staff
directly commands the general staff, which as stated previously, is the
segment that concerns itself with the general overall picture. In the
Air Force, as will be seen, this level is called the coordinating staff.
The general or coordinating staff is shown as G-I through G-4 in the boxes;
Administration, Intelligence, Operations, and Material* Down below the
general staff is found the Special Staff, comprised of officers who are
specialists in their own fields; the Medical, Transport, Artillery, Sig-
nal, etc. In the Army staff organization, the Special Staff Section
Heads report directly to the Commander and not to the Ghief of Staff. In
some staff organizations, special staff officers also have dual roles, in
that they directly command the technical troops assigned to the command.
It should be noted that a difference is evident in the Army and Navy con-
cepts in respect to communications (Signal) divisions. In the Navy, the
communication function is at, what the army calls the general staff level,
whereas in the Army it is at the special staff level*
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Most Artsy staffs are generally organized along the same patterns.
This characteristic is due mostly to the relatively fixed requirements
for staff assistance to the comaander in each organic element of the
Army. The Battalion, Regiment, Division, Corps and Army, are of such
organic similarity that standard staffs for the commanders at their re-
spective levels are natural. In addition, this method facilitates aca-
demic instruction in the preparation of staff officers for staff duties,
and permits the shifting of these officers readily from staff to staff as
basically qualified staff officers.
Figure Ilj. shows the structure of a typical Air Force Staff. Here
again is seen the personal staff as utilized in the Army system. At the
level of the Army general staff is found the Coordinating Staff, whose
groups consists of A-I through A-U, and permits the inclusion of others
as required. Again below is found the special staff group, communications
being one of this group. At times the Air Force includes communications
under operations. The Air Force organization resembles a more flexible
system in its contour and pattern than does the Army due, apparently, to
its similarity to the Navy's requirements for moulding its own task
forces for particular situations.
In summary then, we find that no Haval staffs are identical. The
reason for this is that the missions and special circumstances, and the
organizational concepts of the Commander, are seldom the same. Naval
staffs, as pointed out, due to space, time, and operational considerations,
to say nothing of the variability of missions and forces require flexi-
bility. The Air Force has more or less the same flexibility in their
staff concepts of organization, whereas the Army has a somewhat more rigid
staff organizational pattern.
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The command and staff structure of the United States Navy is an
adequate and efficient instrumentality for the management of vast com-
plexes and aggregates such as modern fleets and shore establisliments
.
The system provides for an organized division of labor "which extends
the individual capacities of the Commander, without violating the prin-
ciple of "unity of command".
The naval staff structure which has emerged through centuries of
military staff evolution represents uniqueness in organizational patterns.
The Navy's staff usage appears to exploit all well established prin-
ciples of management and organization, and achieves a high degree of
efficiency in consideration of the problems that lie within the area, and
the scope of application and sheer magnitude.
Naval staffs are designed to meet the requirements of various opera-
tional situations. Unlike the other services, the Navy does not have a
definite or dogmatic organizational plan for universal adoption. This
allows the Commander to exploit his own ideas of organizational tech-
niques, and to fit his staff more closely to the peculiar requirements
of his command.
This organizational freedom has not produced a wide variation in
representative naval staffs, rather a fairly standard pattern has emerged.
This in effect reconciles the apparent paradox of flexibility versus
standardization
•
The high degree of success and efficiency achieved in World War II
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TWOTTaFIVB PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION1
1. Operation and intelligence work requires centralization of authority
and clear-cut allocation of responsibility,
2. Supervisory officials cannot safely take anything for granted in the
alerting of subordinates.
3. Any doubt that outposts should be given information should always be
resolved in favor of supplying the information.
k» The delegation of authority or the issuance of orders entails the
duty of inspection to determine that the official mandate is proper-
ly exercised.
$. The ijaplementation of official orders must be followed with closest
supervision*
6. The maintenance of alertness to responsibility must be insured
through repetition.
7. Complacency and procrastination are out of place where sudden and
decisive action are of the essence.
8. The coordination and the proper evaluation of intelligence in times
of stress must be insured by continuity of service and centralization
of responsibility in competent officials.
9* The unapproachable or superior attitude of officials is fatal; there
should never be any hesitancy in asking for clarification of instruc-
tions or in seeking advice on matters that are in doubt.
10. There is no substitute for imagination and resourcefulness on the
part of supervisory and intelligence officials.
11. Communications must be characterized by clarity, forthrightness, and
appropriateness
•
12. There is great danger in careless paraphrasing of information re-
ceived, and every effort should be made to insure that the paraphras-
ed material reflects the true meaning and significance of the origi-
nal.
I. These principles of organization were prepared by the
Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack.
Reprinted in the Naval War College publication Principles of Naval Staff
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13. Procedures mast be sufficiently flexible to meet the exigencies of
unusual situations.
IU. Restriction of highly confidential information to a minimum number
of officials, -while often necessary, should not be carried to the
point of prejudicing the work of the organization,
15. There is a great danger of being blinded by the self evident.
16. Officials should at all times give subordinates the benefit of
information.
17. An official who neglects to familiarize hJaaself in detail with his
organization should forfeit his responsibility.
18. Failure can be avoided in the long run only by preparation for any
eventuality.
19. Officials, on a personal basis, should never countermand an official
instruction.
20. Personal or official jealousy will wreck any organization.
21. Personal friendship, without more, should never be accepted in lieu
of liason, or confused therewith, where the latter is necessary to
the proper functioning of two or more agencies.
22. No considerations should be permitted as excuse for failure to per-
form a fundamental task.
23* Superiors must at all times keep their subordinates adequately
informed and, conversely, subordinates should keep their superiors
informed.
2l|. The administrative organization of any establishment must be design-
ed to locate failures and to assess responsibility and authority.










1. The doctrine of "completed staff work" is a doctrine of this
office.
2. "Completed Staff Work" is the study of a problem, and presenta-
tion of a solution, by a staff officer, in such a form that all that re-
mains to be done on the part of the head of the staff division, or the
commander, is to indicate his approval, or disapproval of the completed
action. The words "completed action" are emphasized because the more
difficult the problem is, the more the tendency is to present the prob-
lem to the chief in piecemeal fashion. It is your duty as a staff officer
to work out the details. You should not consult your chief in the deter-
mination of those details, no matter how perplexing they may be. You
may and should consult other staff officers. The product, whether it
involves the pronouncement of a new policy or effects an established one,
should, when presented to the chief for approval or disapproval, will be
worked out in the finished form.
3. The impulse which often comes to the inexperienced staff offi-
cer to ask the chief what to do recurs more often when the problem is
difficult. It is accompanied by a feeling of mental frustration. It is
so easy to ask the chief what to do, and it appears so easy for him to
answer. Resist that impulse. You will succumb to it only if you do not
know your job. It is your .job to advise the chief what to do, not to
ask him what you ought to do. He needs answers, not questions. Your
job is to study, write, restudy, and rewrite until you have evolved a
single proposed action—the best one of all you have considered. Your
chief merely approves or disapproves.
k» Do not worry your chief with long explanations and memoranda.
"Writing a memorandum to your chief does not constitute completed staff
work, but writing a memorandum for your chief to send to someone else
does. Your views should be placed before him in finished form so that
he can make them his views simply by signing his name. In most instances
completed staff work results in a single document prepared for the signa-
ture of the chief, without accompanying comment. If the proper result is
reached, the chief will usually recognize it at once. If he wants com-
ment or explanation, he will ask for it.
S>. The theory of completed staff work does not preclude a "rough
draft 1' but the rough draft must not be a "half baked" idea. It must be
complete in every respect except that it lacks the requisite number of
copies and needs to be neat. But a rough draft must not be used as an
excuse for shifting to the cliief the burden of formulating the action.
I. Promulgated by the Provost Marshall General for the direc-
tion and guidance of the officers in his office and his service school.
First printed in the Army-Navy-Air Force Journal in the issue of January






6. The "completed staff work" theory may result in more work for
the staff officer, but it results in more freedom for the chief. This
is as it should be. Further it accomplishes two things:
(a) The chief is protected from "half-baked" ideas, volu-
minous memoranda, and immature oral presentations.
(b) The staff officer who has a real idea to sell is en-
abled to more readily find a market.
7. "When you have finished your "completed staff work" the final
test is this:
If you were the chief would you be willing to sign the paper
you have prepared, and stake your professional reputation on its
being right?
If the answer is in the negative, take it back and work it over,
because it is not yet "completed staff work".
FOR THE PROVOST MARSHALL GENERAL:
Archer L. Lerch
Colonel JAGB
Deputy Provost Marshall General
.
APPENDIX C
EPITOME OF COMPLETED STAFF 10RK1
Completed Staff TSork
Study of a problem and presentation of its solution in such form
that only approval or disapproval of the completed action is required.
1. flbrk out all details completely.
2. Consult other staff officers.
3. Study, write, restudy, rewrite.
k* Present a single, coordinate proposed action. Do not
equivocate.
5« Do not present long memoranda or explanations. Correct
solutions are usually reoogiaable.
6. Advise the chief what to do. Do not ask him.
If you were the chief, would you sign the paper you have prepared
and thus stake your professional reputation on its being right? If not,
take it back and work it over j it is not yet completed staff work.
I. Text of wall plaques appearing in many staff offices.
Apparently a paraphrase of the Completed Staff Concept promulgated by
the Provost Marshall General (Appendix B).
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